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BRIEF OF FINANCIAL ECONOMISTS AS 
AMICI CURIAE SUPPORTING RESPONDENT 
INTEREST OF AMICI 
Amici include academic financial economists 
who teach and write about public securities 
markets.1
Sanjai Bhagat, Provost Professor of Finance, 
University of Colorado Leeds School of Business. 
   We file this brief in order to clarify the 
areas of agreement and disagreement among 
economists regarding the “Efficient Capital Markets 
Hypothesis” (“ECMH”).  Amici include: 
John H. Cochrane, AQR Capital 
Management Distinguished Service Professor of 
Finance, University of Chicago Booth School of 
Business.  
Darrell Duffie, Dean Witter Distinguished 
Professor of Finance, Stanford University Graduate 
School of Business. 
B. Espen Eckbo, Tuck Centennial Chair in 
Finance, Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth 
College. 
Eugene Fama, Robert R. McCormick 
Distinguished Service Professor of Finance, 
University of Chicago Booth School of Business.  
Professor Fama was a co-recipient of the 2013 Nobel 
Prize in Economics for his work on the efficiency of 
capital markets. 
                                                 
1 This brief has been filed with the written consent of 
the parties, which filed blanket consents with the Clerk of 
Court.  Pursuant to Rule 37.6, counsel for amici affirms that no 
counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, nor 
did any person or entity, other than amici or their counsel, 
make a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission 
of this brief.   
2 
S.P. Kothari, Gordon Y. Billard Professor of 
Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Sloan School of Management.  
Reinier H. Kraakman, Ezra Ripley Thayer 
Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. 
Andrew Lo, Charles E. and Susan T. Harris 
Professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Sloan School of Management 
Burton G. Malkiel, Chemical Bank 
Chairman's Professor of Economics, Emeritus, 
Princeton University. 
Jeffry M. Netter, Georgia Bankers 
Association Chair and Josiah Meigs Professor of 
Finance, University of Georgia. 
Thomas Philippon, Associate Professor of 
Finance, New York University Leonard N. Stern 
School of Business. 
Jay R. Ritter, Cordell Professor of Finance, 
University of Florida.  
Richard Roll, Distinguished Professor of 
Finance and Joel Fried Chair in Applied Finance, 
University of California, Los Angeles. 
David L. Yermack, Albert Fingerhut 
Professor of Finance and Business Transformation, 
New York University Leonard N. Stern School of 
Business. 
  
3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There is widespread debate about market 
efficiency among economists, and the signatories of 
this brief include participants with varying positions 
on that debate.  It is critical, however, to be clear 
about what issues are in dispute—and what issues 
are not.  Economists disagree about whether 
markets perfectly process information and how 
quickly they do so; about whether prices reflect the 
fundamental value of the underlying stock; about the 
size and significance of “bubbles” and other pricing 
anomalies in the market and the extent to which 
non-informational factors affect prices; and about 
whether it is possible to “beat the market” by 
pursuing various investment strategies designed to 
exploit pricing anomalies.  Such disagreements 
existed when Basic was decided in 1988, and they 
exist today. 
But economists do not generally disagree 
about whether market prices respond to new 
material information.  In particular, there is little 
doubt that the stock price will increase reasonably 
promptly after favorable news about a company is 
released and decline after unfavorable news. 
Our conclusion that prices generally move 
reasonably promptly in the predicted direction in 
response to unexpected material public information 
(favorable or unfavorable) is perfectly consistent 
with the view that there are sometimes anomalies in 
the way markets process information and that 
bubbles can exist.    
  
4 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Relationship Between The ECMH 
And The Modest Proposition That Stock 
Prices Move In Response To Material 
Information. 
 Because economists disagree about the extent 
to which securities markets are efficient, it is crucial 
to be clear about the precise economic propositions at 
issue.  The ECMH entails a great deal more than the 
modest proposition that markets typically respond 
reasonably promptly to material information.  That 
much is generally viewed as common ground among 
contemporary economists.     
Eugene Fama’s seminal work in this area 
distinguished among three different types of market 
efficiency: 
“Weak-form” efficiency means that 
historical prices are not predictive of 
future prices.  Excess profits cannot be 
earned using strategies based on 
historical prices. 
“Semi-strong form” efficiency implies 
that all public information is reflected 
in a stock’s current market price, and 
that security prices adjust to new 
publicly available information so that it 
is impossible to earn excess returns by 
trading on that information. 
“Strong-form” efficiency implies that all 
information in the market, whether 
public or private, is accounted for in the 
market price.  Investors cannot 
consistently earn excess profits over a 
5 
long period of time—even if they have 
inside information.2
Although all three models are sometimes 
described as variations of the ECMH, references to 
that hypothesis in the context of describing how 
financial markets actually operate typically refer to 
the “semi-strong” version (SSEMH).
 
3
The key point for present purposes is that 
while the proposition that market prices respond 
relatively promptly to material information about a 
stock is true if the SSEMH is true, it does not 
depend on the SSEMH being true.  The SSEMH 
entails that the market price instantly (or at least 
very quickly) and fully incorporates all publicly 
available information about the stock.  It does not 
tolerate even modest lags or other anomalies. 
  The SSEMH 
has been employed in a variety of different contexts 
for a variety of different purposes.  Some claims are 
more controversial than others among economists.   
                                                 
2 Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of 
Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. Fin. 383 (1970).  See also 
Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(Easterbrook, J.) (explaining the difference between these three 
forms of market efficiency). 
3 See Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J. 
Fin. 1575, 1575 (1991) (“I take the market efficiency hypothesis 
to be the simple statement that security prices fully reflect all 
available information . . . .  A weaker and economically sensible 
version of the efficiency hypothesis says that prices reflect 
information to the point where the marginal benefits of acting 
on the information (the profits to be made) do not exceed the 
marginal cost.”). Standard finance textbooks provide similar 
definitions.  See, e.g., Richard Brealey, Stewart Myers & 
Franklin Allen, Principles of Corporate Finance 317-18 (10th 
ed. 2011); Stephen A. Ross, Randolph W. Westerfield & Jeffrey 
Jaffe, Corporate Finance 430-31 (9th ed. 2010). 
6 
Professional economists have debated for 
decades the extent to which the securities markets 
actually conform to the SSEMH.  Excellent work has 
been done on both sides of this debate.  Indeed, the 
Nobel Committee awarded last year’s prize in 
Economics to both Eugene Fama, the “father” of the 
efficient markets hypothesis, and Robert Shiller, one 
of that hypothesis’s leading critics. 
The SSEMH is based on two propositions: (1) 
that most investors rationally invest on the basis of 
available information; and (2) to the extent that 
some investors act irrationally, their investments do 
not affect prices because well-funded, highly 
sophisticated investors can drive the prices back to 
fundamentals in a process known as “arbitrage.”   
Authors writing in the field of behavioral 
economics disagree with both propositions. First, 
they argue that investor irrationality is pervasive 
rather than occasional or limited. Second, they argue 
that because of the costs and risks of arbitrage—the 
arbitrager must typically borrow money in 
anticipation of the market correcting itself, which 
may not happen quickly enough—arbitrage does not 
always drive prices back to fundamentals.4
                                                 
4 See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer, Inefficient Markets: An 
Introduction to Behavioral Finance 10-12 (2000) (noting 
instances of investor irrationality); Daniel Kahneman & Mark 
Riepe, Aspects of Investor Psychology, 24 J. Portfolio Mgt. 52 
(1998) (same); Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. Fin. 529 (1986) 
(arguing that investors sometimes trade on “noise” rather than 
information). 
 As one 
critic puts it, “real‐world arbitrage is risky and 
therefore limited,” and its effectiveness depends “on 
the availability of close substitutes for securities 
7 
whose price is potentially affected by noise trading.”5 
SSEMH proponents disagree about the magnitude of 
the limits on arbitrage and argue that any anomalies 
are quickly eliminated in the market.6
The debate has played out through a series of 
empirical studies.  In the 1980s, for example, Robert 
Shiller published stock market data that in his view 
showed that stock market prices were considerably 
more volatile than the SSEMH could account for.
  
7  
Other scholars found that stock prices tended to 
overreact to news—good news about a company 
might cause the price to increase in the short term 
and then fall in the long term as the market digested 
the information more carefully.8  Other findings 
include superior performance of small companies 
and predictability of returns according to market to 
book ratios.9  As Professor Shleifer points out, “this 
evidence points to excess returns based on stale 
information, in contrast to semi‐strong form market 
efficiency.”10
                                                 
5 Shleifer, Inefficient Markets, at 13. 
  Defenders of the SSEMH, however, 
6 See, e.g., id. at 4 (summarizing arguments by Milton 
Friedman and Eugene Fama that “[t]he process of arbitrage 
brings security prices in line with their fundamental values 
even when some investors are not fully rational and their 
demands are correlated, as long as securities have close 
substitutes”). 
7 See Robert J. Shiller, Do Stock Prices Move Too Much 
to be Justified by Subsequent Changes in Dividends? 71 Am. 
Econ. Rev. 421 (1981). 
8 See Werner F. M. De Bondt & Richard Thaler, Does 
the Stock Market Overreact? 40 J. Fin. 793 (1985). 
9 See Shleifer, Inefficient Markets, at 18-19 (collecting 
sources). 
10 Id. at 18. 
8 
have argued that the data can be explained on the 
basis of hidden factors that are consistent with 
investor rationality.11  Or they argue that the 
anomalies are trivial, and tend to disappear after 
they are identified as rational investors take 
advantage of them.12
We have outlined these debates in some detail 
because it is important to understand what is and is 
not in dispute.  Economists disagree about the 
ability of arbitrage to compensate for investor 
irrationality; the possibility of “beating the market” 
through investment strategies based on either value 
investing or exploiting irrational tendencies of 
investors; the importance of non-information-based 
factors to stock prices; and the speed and 
completeness of the market’s ability to incorporate 
material information about a stock.   
 
But economists generally do not disagree 
about whether markets respond to material 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, 
Multifactor Explanations of Asset Pricing Anomalies, 51 J. Fin. 
55 (1996); Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Common 
Risk Factors in the Returns on Bonds and Stocks, 33 J. Fin. 
Econ. 3 (1993); see generally Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, 
Empirical Studies of Corporate Law, in 2 Handbook of Law and 
Economics 948 n.1 (Polinsky & Shavell, eds. 2007) (collecting 
studies). 
12 See, e.g., Burton G. Malkiel, A Random Walk Down 
Wall Street 267-300 (10th ed. 2011); Ray Ball, The Global 
Financial Crisis and the Efficient Market Hypothesis: What 
Have We Learned? 21 J. Applied Corp. Fin. 8, 15 (2009) (noting 
that funds established to take advantage of behavioral 
economics strategies have failed to outperform the market); 
William Schwert, Anomalies and Market Efficiency, in 
Handbook of Economics and Finance 940 (2003) (finding that 
anomalies identified by critiques tend “to disappear, reverse, or 
attenuate”). 
9 
information.  As Professor Shiller recently wrote in 
explaining the extent of his disagreement with 
Professor Fama, “Of course, prices reflect available 
information.”13
II. Current Disagreements Among 
Economists Over The Efficiency Of 
Securities Markets Do Not Undermine 
The Modest Assumption That Securities 
Prices Generally Respond To 
Information Reasonably Promptly, In A 
Predictable Direction. 
 
 Economists’ debates about the efficiency of 
securities markets are interesting and important, 
and they have significant implications for 
government regulatory policy as well as strategies 
that investors should pursue.  But it is important to 
be clear that economists generally agree that stock 
prices respond to material information in a 
predictable direction.  
A. Disagreement Among Economists 
Concerning The Extent To Which 
Stock Prices Reflect Underlying 
Values Is Not The Same As A 
Disagreement Over Whether Prices 
Respond To Information. 
The SSEMH, as stated by Professor Fama and 
other proponents of efficient markets, does not 
simply say that stock prices move in response to 
information; rather, it holds that the market 
                                                 
13 Robert J. Shiller, Sharing Nobel Honors, and 
Agreeing to Disagree, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 2013, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/27/business/sharing-nobel-
honors-and-agreeing-to-disagree.html?_r=0.   
10 
completely digests all public information about the 
stock, so that security prices fully reflect all 
available information (or at least that prices reflect 
information to the point where the marginal benefits 
of acting on information do not exceed the marginal 
costs of doing so) and that prices are a function only 
of that relevant information.   
Critics of SSEMH, on the other hand, insist 
that this dynamic is not the whole story. Sometimes 
markets incorporate information slowly or 
incompletely, and sometimes stock prices display 
volatility that cannot be explained by changes in the 
available information about stocks.14
The focus of these debates is on whether stock 
prices reflect fundamental value—that is, the actual 
value of the company—not on whether stock prices 
can be counted on to move up or down in response to 
information.  That is why so much of the literature 
criticizing the SSEMH refers to fundamental value 
and fundamental efficiency.
   
15
                                                 
14 See, e.g., Robert J. Shiller, From Efficient Markets 
Theory to Behavioral Finance, 17 J. Econ. Perspectives 83, 84 
(2003). 
  That literature goes 
far beyond the question of whether markets respond 
in a predictable direction and reasonably promptly to 
material information. 
15 See, e.g., Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock 
Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal, Economic and 
Policy Analysis, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 7, 20 (1994) (cited Petrs. Br. 
16 for the proposition that “capital markets are not 
fundamentally efficient”); William O. Fisher, Does the Efficient 
Market Theory Help Us Do Justice in a Time of Madness? 54 
Emory L. J. 843, 898 (2005) (cited Petrs. Br. 18 for the 
proposition that, during the 1998-2001 technology bubble, 
“stock prices [were] far away from fundamental values”). 
11 
Economists have tested the SSEMH 
empirically primarily by testing whether it is, in 
fact, possible to earn excess returns through 
particular trading strategy.  The results are 
disputed; Andrei Schleifer and Lawrence  Summers, 
for example, have argued that it is possible to make 
excess returns—that is, to “beat the market”—under 
certain circumstances.16
The critical point, however, is that this debate 
about excess returns has little to do with the modest 
assumption that prices move reasonably promptly in 
a predictable direction in response to favorable or 
unfavorable public information. The excess returns 
debate goes to whether stock prices are 
fundamentally accurate, not whether they move in 
response to information.  Moreover, behavioral 
economists do not dispute that market prices 
generally remain the best available indicia of share 
value, and their advice to investors generally 
dovetails with that offered by proponents of the 
SSEMH.  Professor Shiller, for example, has 
acknowledged that it is “unlikely that the average 
amateur investor can get rich quickly by trading in 
the markets based on publicly available information 
. . . . I personally believe this, and in my own 
investing I have avoided trading too much, and have 
a high level of skepticism about investing tips.”
   
17
The supporters and critics of the SSEMH also 
debate the extent of any need for regulation of the 
market.  But there is a general consensus that 
fraudulent misrepresentations harm market 
   
                                                 
16 See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, 
The Noise Trader Approach to Finance, J. Fin. Econ. Persp. 19 
(Spring 1990). 
17 Shiller, Sharing Nobel Honors. 
12 
participants and should not be condoned; the 
SSEMH, after all, depends on the availability of 
public and truthful information to drive prices.  Nor 
do skeptics of market efficiency dispute that 
information affects prices—they simply assert that 
other things affect prices, too.  Because the market 
responds to public statements, there is a substantial 
public interest in ensuring that those statements are 
truthful.   
The economic proposition that prices move 
reasonably promptly in a predictable direction in 
response to favorable or unfavorable public 
information does not require that markets be 
anywhere near perfectly efficient.  Nor does it 
require that one take any position on whether 
particular trading strategies might “beat the 
market” or whether government regulation is 
appropriate.  
B. Economists Broadly Agree That 
Stock Prices In Developed Markets 
Generally Do Respond To 
Information. 
The recognition of a relationship between 
information and stock prices is considerably older 
than the ECMH and related ideas developed by 
Professor Fama and others in the 1960s.18
                                                 
18 Courts and commentators have recognized that stock 
markets respond to and reflect material information—including 
false information—for at least two centuries. See, e.g., Rex v. De 
Berenger, 3 M.& S. 67, 105 Eng. Rep. 536 (K.B. 1814); see also 
Barbara Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing 
with Reliance Requirements in Certain Open Market 
Transactions, 62 N.C. L. Rev. 435, 456 (1984).   
  William 
O. Douglas, who was intimately involved in drafting 
13 
the Securities Act, articulated this understanding in 
1934: 
[E]ven though an investor has neither 
the time, money, nor intelligence to 
assimilate the mass of information in 
the registration statement, there will be 
those who can and who will do so, 
whenever there is a broad market.  The 
judgment of those experts will be 
reflected in the market price.19
Douglas’s formulation did not assert that the price 
perfectly reflected all available information or the 
stock’s fundamental value, and he did not deny that 
other factors, including various forms of 
irrationality, might also affect prices.  His point was 
simply that stock prices respond to material public 
information.  Both proponents and critics of the 
SSEMH can agree that Douglas was correct on this 
point. 
 
 It is not accurate to say there is a “consensus” 
among economists rejecting the SSEMH.  It is 
accurate to say that the SSEMH is controversial, but 
that controversy simply does not extend to rejecting 
the relationship between information and price 
movement.  As one journalist who has written an 
intellectual history of the economic debate 
concluded, “[behavioral economists] still believe that 
markets work pretty well and that trying to outguess 
the collective wisdom of millions of investors is 
usually futile.”20
                                                 
19 William O. Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 Yale 
L.J. 522, 524 (1934). 
  Most important, economists 
20 Justin Fox, Is The Market Rational? No, say the 
experts. But neither are you – so don’t go thinking you can 
outsmart it, Fortune (Dec. 9, 2002), available at 
14 
generally agree that material information—whether 
truthful or fraudulent—will generally affect the 
price of a stock and that the effect will be in a 
predictable direction. 
CONCLUSION 
 The judgment below should be affirmed. 
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